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Abstract: Using Chinese province-level panel data for 2001–2009, we investigate 
significant factors for the development of financial intermediation via trade credit in 
developing economies. First, we confirm that a competitive market environment, a 
well-functioning legal system and greater bank loans for non-state-sector firms promote the 
development of trade credit in China. Conversely, corruption hinders its development. 
Second, proper functioning of the legal system and bank lending to non-state-sector firms 
are highly likely to be the cause of the complex relationships between these determinants. 
Finally, an increase in the number of lawyers effectively improves the quality and function 
of the legal system, which in turn alleviates the harmful influence of corruption on trade 
credit development. 
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Taking China as a case study, we investigate significant determinants for the 
development of financial intermediation through trade credit in developing economies.
1
 In 
general, developing economies including China do not have a well-developed formal 
financial system such as banks and a capital market. In this environment, trade credit is an 
important candidate for effective alternative financing. Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2001) argue that firms are more likely to rely on trade credit in economies with inferior 
legal systems. Almost all developing economies have less efficient legal institutions. Özlü 
and Yalçın (2012) find that financially constrained firms with limited access to bank 
finance tend to substitute trade credit in Turkey, which has a more developed economy than 
China. 
Previous studies provide a background for this work. Many have investigated the 
supplier motivation for offering trade credit. On the one hand, some argue that a 
competitive market environment promotes the development of trade credit. Fabbri and 
Klapper (2008) and Van Horen (2004) show empirically that firms with weak market 
power relative to their customers generally offer more trade credit. Since the weak market 
power of supplier firms compared to their customers mainly stems from the competitive 
market for their products, these findings can be interpreted as supporting the concept that a 
competitive market environment can promote the development of financial intermediation 
through trade credit. Fisman and Raturi (2004) present a theoretical overview of market 
competition and trade credit provision. They state that competition among suppliers 
encourages customers to build a relationship with a supplier and establish creditworthiness 
                                                   
1
 We call the development of financial intermediation through trade credit “development of 
trade credit” or “trade credit development” hereafter. 
3 
 
to obtain trade credit. Their theoretical expectation is supported by empirical evidence from 
African data. Taking Indonesian firms as a case study and using firm-level micro-data, 
Hyndman and Serio (2010) report an interesting finding: an inverse U-shaped relationship 
exists between market competition and trade credit supply by vendors.
2
 
On the other hand, securing of property rights by a legal system can positively affect 
the development of trade credit. In studying the relative importance of the courts and their 
relationship in contract enforcement in the context of Russia, Ukraine and Eastern 
European countries, Johnson et al. (2002) confirm that legal protection of property rights by 
well-functioning courts encourages entrepreneurs to offer trade credit. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no comprehensive empirical 
analysis of the determinants of trade credit development, particularly in the context of 
developing economies. Previous studies focused on single determinants of trade credit 
development and did not investigate the complex relations between determinants. Therefore, 
we investigate the effective determinants of trade credit development among candidate 
factors in the context of developing economies. Chinese province-level data are used. The 
differences in trade credit development between provinces enable us to tackle this issue 
effectively. 
The viewpoint of trade credit development in the context of the Chinese economy 
also provides important suggestions for our tests. 
Pointing out that although it does not have a well-developed legal or financial system, 
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 Aktas et al. (2012) present an interesting explanation and empirical evidence of the 
motivation for firms to receive trade credit rather than offer it. They argue that firm 
mangers use trade credit finance to convey valuable information to external investors, such 
as the quality of the firm’s investments. 
4 
 
China has one of the fastest-growing economies, Allen et al. (2005) argue that China may 
be an important counter-example to the focus of the legal and financial literature on formal 
systems. They suggest that alternative financing channels, rather than formal external 
finance, support the fastest-growing Chinese firms, namely private firms. In response to 
their argument, several studies have investigated whether alternative financing channels 
really work as a substitute for formal financial systems in supporting the growth of firms 
and the economy in China (Cheng and Degryse, 2007; Ge and Qiu, 2007; Ayyagari et al., 
2010; Cull et al., 2009; Du et al., 2012). Although no consensus on this issue has been 
reached, alternative financing channels are likely to contribute to the fast economic growth 
of China, at least to some extent. 
As stated above, one possible alternative financing channel is trade credit. Among the 
studies mentioned, Cull et al. (2009) and Ge and Qiu (2007) explicitly explore trade credit 
in China.
3
 Statistical findings by Fabbri and Klapper (2008) are derived from firm-level 
micro-data for Chinese firms. 
Fisman and Raturi (2004) state that previous research has often treated trade credit 
access as a proxy for inter-firm trust (Johnson et al., 2002; Fafchamps, 2004), which they 
adopt in their own work. Therefore, our investigation of the determinants of trade credit 
development in China can be also interpreted as a study of factors that lead to trust between 
Chinese firms. The development of inter-firm trust should contribute to economic growth in 
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 Using a World Bank data set of Chinese firms, Du et al. (2012) compare the relative 
importance of bank loans and trade credit in promoting firm performance. While their 
findings favor bank loans over trade credit, there are crucial problems in their empirical 
analysis, including an invalid instrumental variable for trade credit, inadequate control of 
the market structure (monopolistic or competitive) and differing production technology 




(Figures 1 and 2) 
Fig. 1 shows a positive correlation between the development of trade credit and the 
provincial economy.
4
 This positive correlation implies that economically more developed 




Furthermore, interior provinces not only had less developed trade credit in the early 
2000s, but have failed to develop trade credit since then, while coastal provinces had more 
developed trade credit in the early 2000s and have further developed trade credit since then. 
As a result, the disparity in trade credit development between interior and coastal provinces 
has increased (Fig. 2). This puts in question the sustainability of recent economic 
development in the interior provinces. Therefore, it is important to investigate how to 
develop trade credit in China to guide policy-making for effective financing channels, 
particularly in the interior provinces. 
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 Fig. 1 provides observation data for 2008. Similar positive correlations exist for each year 
during the period 2001–2009, but are not reported for the sake of brevity. Furthermore, 
while we measure the development of trade credit in a province as accounts 
receivable/gross assets, we can obtain the same positive correlation between the 
development of trade credit and the provincial economy even when using accounts 
payable/gross assets. This is because accounts receivable and payable are largely balanced 
in a province. For firm-level behavior, Fabbri and Klapper (2008) also find that firms tend 
to match contract terms for accounts receivable and payable in China, which likely results 
in balanced receivables and payables. 
5
 Coastal areas here comprise the following provinces: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Fujian, and Guangdong. The interior areas studied 
comprise the other provinces. 
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Section 2 explains the conceptual framework and introduces candidate determinants 
of trade credit development in China and the complex relations among them. Section 3 
specifies the empirical models used and explains the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents 
the data used for our econometric analysis. Section 5 describes and discusses the estimation 
results. Conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
 
2. Conceptual framework 
In this section we construct the basic framework for our study by introducing several 
candidate determinants of trade credit development in China and describing the complex 
relations among them. 
 
2.1. Candidate determinants of trade credit development in China 
We consider the following four candidate determinants of trade credit development in 
China: a competitive market environment, a well-functioning legal system, less corruption, 
and financial factors affecting demand and supply for trade credit finance.
6
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 Giannetti et al. (2011) find that suppliers of differentiated products and services offer 
greater trade credit than suppliers of standardized goods. This is likely because suppliers of 
differentiated products and services are hard to replace since they provide unique or highly 
customized inputs and differentiated products and services are difficult to divert for 
unintended purposes. This leads to strong relationships between suppliers of differentiated 
goods and services and their customers and shields such suppliers against buyer 
opportunism (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). This finding suggests that industrial 
relationships between firms and the nature of goods traded is a determinant for trade credit 




(1) Competitive market environment 
As shown by Van Horen (2004), Fisman and Raturi (2004), and Fabbri and Klapper 
(2008), a competitive market environment is a prospective determinant of trade credit 
development. The reason for choosing this candidate determinant has been provided in 
Section 1. A variant of market competitiveness is the presence of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). First, a greater SME presence directly implies a more competitive 
market environment. Second, SMEs – which are likely to suffer more from credit 
constraints because of weaker banking relationships – tend to demand trade credit finance 




(2) A well-functioning legal system 
As Johnson et al. (2002) find in the context of Russia, Ukraine and Eastern European 
countries, legal protection of property rights can encourage trade credit via more reliable 
contract enforcement. More reliable contract enforcement enables more trade credit to be 
granted and received. However, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) find that firms 
tend to rely on trade credit in economies with inferior legal systems. This implies the 
possibility that an ill-functioning legal system compels firms to use trade credit as mutually 
beneficial financial intermediation. In this case, the legal system is a negative factor for the 
development of trade credit. 
                                                                                                                                                           
provincial level in China are unavailable. Therefore, this candidate determinant could not 
be investigated in the present study. 
7
 The attachment of importance to market structure, specifically the presence of SMEs, is 




(3) Less corruption 
Corruption as a negative factor is a candidate determinant of trade credit development. 
Here we assume that corruption essentially involve insecure property rights due to 
expropriation by the government and weak institutions for contract enforcement (Acemoglu 
and Johnson, 2005; Cull and Xu, 2005). Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and Cull and Xu 
(2005) separate insecure property rights into failed protection of citizens against 
expropriation by the government and unreliable contract enforcement. However, in the 
reality of the Chinese economy, these two types of insecure property rights are closely 
related. Our field survey in China reveals anecdotal observations that grabbing of firms by 
the government causes unreliable contract enforcement and thus reduces the motivation for 
firms to execute contracts for payment. Firms attach greater importance to maintaining 
good relations with the government to alleviate such grabbing or obtain government 
protection in the political field than to establishing trust with their business partners by 
executing contracts in the market.
8
 This in turn also discourages their business partner 
firms from executing contracts. Unreliable contract execution then hinders trade credit 
development. 
 
(4) Financial factors: demand and supply for trade credit finance 
Financial factors are also likely to be important for trade credit development. These 
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 Cai et al. (2011) empirically investigate corruption in China using firm data for 
entertainment and travel costs. Their theoretical framework and statistical evidence suggest 
a type of tradeoff between investments by firms into relational capital with their business 




factors can affect trade credit development through both demand for and supply of trade 
credit finance. As stated in the next section, demand for trade credit finance mainly comes 
from non-state-sector firms in China. In addition, the higher value of accounts 
receivable/gross assets for non-state-sector compared to state-sector firms in the China 
Economic Census Yearbooks 2004 and 2008, for example, indicates that the main suppliers 
of trade credit are also non-state-sector firms. Therefore, we pay particular attention to 
demand for and supply of trade credit in non-state-sector firms. 
On the demand side, firms with less access to substitutive external funds, typically 
bank loans, may be more dependent on receiving trade credit for their finance.
9
 Biais and 
Gollier (1997) argue that firms receive more trade credit when they receive less in bank 
loans. Therefore, more bank loans for non-state-sector firms can lead to less demand for 
trade credit finance.
10
 Furthermore, a higher share of non-state-owned commercial banks in 
total bank lending is expected to increase bank loans for non-state-sector firms, since the 
primary function of state banks is to channel savings to state-sector firms in China 
(Guariglia and Poncet, 2008; Boyreau-Debray, 2003). Therefore, a higher share of 
non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank lending could also decrease demand for 
trade credit finance by increasing bank loans for non-state-sector firms. Thus, when 
focusing on the demand side for trade credit finance, bank loans for non-state-sector firms 
and the share of non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank lending are direct and 
indirect negative factors, respectively. However, we should also take into account other 
                                                   
9
 Our consideration of demand-side factors for trade credit is based on a useful comment 
by an anonymous reviewer. 
10
 This arises partly from the more expensive financing costs for trade credit than bank 
loans (Brandt and Li, 2003). 
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effects, namely, supply-side factors. 
On the supply side, more bank loans for non-state-sector firms and a higher share of 
non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank lending can allow non-state-sector firms, 
the main suppliers of trade credit, to offer more trade credit to their customers. In other 
words, it could be that these two factors facilitate credit creation among firms using trade 
credit. Considering the biased financial allocation through bank lending to state-sector over 
non-state-sector firms in China, the influence on trade credit supply of bank loans for 
non-state-sector firms cannot be ignored (Guariglia et al., 2011; Ding et al., 2012). Thus, 
when focusing on the supply side for trade credit finance, these are positive factors. It 
depends on whether the demand effect or the supply effects are dominant as to whether 
these financial factors work positively or negatively for trade credit development in China. 
This should be investigated empirically. 
 
2.2. Complex relations between the determinants 
The determinants mentioned above are not independent but have complex relations 
with each other. An example is the causality between two determinants whereby a 
well-functioning legal system could directly alleviate corruption, which subsequently 
results in trade credit development. More bank loans for non-state-sector firms and a higher 
share of non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank lending might also mitigate 
government corruption. The mechanism might be that more bank loans for non-state-sector 
firms (or, equivalently, fewer bank loans for state-sector firms) that are possible 
government expropriation targets might allow them to avoid corruption, namely being 
grabbed by the government. 
Corruption could also affect other determinants. It is likely to discourage prospective 
firms from entering the market for fear that the government will grab them. This definitely 
11 
 
leads to a less competitive market environment. On the contrary, a well-functioning legal 
system is likely to encourage prospective firms to enter the market via secure property 
rights and contract enforcement. This leads to a competitive market environment. 
Furthermore, serious corruption could harm the functioning of the legal system 
through political pressure from the government. In addition, corruption could be associated 
with greater financial support of state-sector firms through bank lending. 
To analyze these complex relations, we consider first-stage estimation results in an 
econometric analysis using system GMM estimation with “collapsed” instrumental 
variables. This will give us an insight into which determinants are primary factors in trade 
credit development, which should be priority targets for policy makers. 
 
3. Empirical models and estimation strategy 
This section explains the empirical models and estimation strategy used to analyze 
the significant determinants of trade credit development in China. For this purpose, we use 
the following empirical model: 
 
Trade credit development it = α + αt + β1 competitive market environment it–1 
+ β2 legal system it–1 + β3 corruption it–1 
+ β4 financial factors it–1 + ε it,    (1) 
 
where i and t denote the province and time (year), respectively, and 
 
εit = μi + eit. 
 
The disturbance term ε it has two components: the province-specific fixed effect μi and the 
12 
 
pure error term (idiosyncratic shocks) eit.
11
 The error term eit is taken to be independently 
distributed over i and t with zero mean. The province-specific fixed effect μi is expected to 
control unobservable province-specific and time-invariant factors. αt is a year-specific term. 
Thus, β1, β2, β3 and β4 are the coefficients to be estimated. 
We set a one-period time lag between the dependent variable (trade credit 
development t) and important independent variables (competitive market environment t–1, 
legal system t–1, corruption t–1, and financial factors t–1) to avoid reverse causality between 
the dependent and independent variables as much as possible. Variables in bold font 
represent variable vectors. 
We use the system GMM estimation technique developed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998) in panel estimation to cope with the remaining endogeneity problem of independent 
variables.
12,13,14
 The system GMM estimator is designed to address the endogeneity of 
independent variables in panel estimation and the weak instrument problem in the 
first-differenced GMM proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). It combines regression in 
differences with regression in levels, where the instruments for the former are generally the 
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 In system GMM estimation, it is difficult to assume random effects for the firm-specific 
term μi because μi is structurally correlated with lagged dependent variable as an 
independent variable in the dynamic panel model for which first-differenced and system 
GMM estimations were originally proposed. 
12
 Typically, the remaining endogeneity problem of independent variables is caused by 
reverse causality from dependent to independent variables and omitting an independent 
variable into the error term eit.  
13
 See Roodman (2008) for the system GMM estimation. 
14
 We use two-step instead of one-step GMM since the former is asymptotically more 
efficient. Thus, we apply the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction to the two-step 
covariance matrix to settle the potentially downward-biased two-step standard errors. 
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lagged levels of endogenous or predetermined variables and the instruments for the latter 
are the lagged differences of those variables. 
Among the independent variables introduced above, province and year dummies 
measuring province- and year-specific effects, respectively, can be assumed to be 
exogenous. Endogeneity is suspected for the other independent variables. A one-period lag 
is taken for these variables. Strictly speaking, therefore, they are not endogenous but are 
predetermined variables in that they can be correlated with eit–1 and e before period t–1 and 
cannot be correlated with eit and e after period t. Since realizations of the predetermined 
variables occur before that of the current error term eit, they cannot be correlated. 
Thus, in system GMM, estimation of first-differenced and level equations for (1) is 
conducted using adequate instrument variables for each equation. The first-differenced 
equation for (1) removes and controls unobservable province-specific and time-invariant 
factors, μi. Thus, for the first-differenced equation, two-period lagged levels of the 
predetermined variables (competitive market environmentt–2, legal systemt–2, corruptiont–2, 
and financial factorst–2) are used as instrumental variables in addition to first-differenced 
year dummies as exogenous variables. The coefficients for province dummies are estimated 
in level equation (1). Thus, for estimation of level equation (1), one-period lagged 
differences for the predetermined variables (Δcompetitive market environment t–1, Δlegal 
system t–1, Δcorruption t–1, and Δfinancial factors t–1) are used as instrumental variables in 
addition to province and year dummies as exogenous variables. Here, lagged differences for 
the predetermined variables are defined as ΔX it–1 = X it–1 – X it–2. 
To avoid overfitting of large instruments to endogenous variables, we limit instrument 
variables to two-period lagged levels and one-period lagged differences of the 
predetermined variables besides exogenous variables, and use these instruments in 
collapsed form (Roodman, 2008, 2009). Because the data are provincial panel data and the 
14 
 
number of individual units (provinces in this case) is relatively small, we should pay 
particular attention to the overfitting problem in using large instruments. Furthermore, these 
limited instruments enable us to easily check the first-stage estimation results. This is quite 
helpful for disentangling the complex relations between determinants of trade credit 
development in China. 
The validity of the instruments introduced above depends on the two following 
assumptions. The first is that the instruments are exogenous. More precisely, the 
instruments used are not correlated with current error terms (Δeit = eit – eit–1) for difference 
regression and are not correlated with ε it = μi + eit for level regression. The second is that 
the pure error term eit is not serially correlated. For these assumptions, two tests are 
proposed to assess the validity of the instruments. The first, for instrument exogeneity, is 
the Sargan or Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of 
an instrument by checking the validity of moment conditions in the sample used.
15
 The 
second, for serial correlation of eit, is the autoregressive test proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). By construction, the error term in difference regression is allowed to be 
first-order serially correlated, whereas second-order serial correlation of the error term 
violates the instrument validity. Thus, checking the second-order serial correlation of the 
differenced error term, AR(2), works as a test for serial correlation of eit. 
To measure trade credit development, the dependent variable, we use accounts 
receivable for non-state-sector firms/gross assets. Trade credit has an even more important 
role in the corporate finance of non-state-sector compared to state-sector firms (Ge and Qiu, 
2007), which is why we use trade credit development for non-state-sector firms as the 
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 We use the Hansen test as the overidentifying restriction test because the Sargan test 
statistic is not robust to heteroscedasticity, while the Hansen test statistic, which is the 
minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion function, is robust. 
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dependent variable of our empirical model. 
We now turn to the independent variables. 
Competitive market environment represents variables for measuring how competitive 
the economy of a province is for each year. The variables are (number of firms/province 
industrial gross output)–1 and producer price indices for manufactured goods–1. More 
precisely, number of firms refers to industrial firms. Note that a higher second variable 
represents a more monopolistic and thus a less competitive market environment. The 
presence of SMEs, a variant of market competitiveness, is measured by presence of SMEs 
in gross output–1 for each province. 
Legal system represents variables for measuring how well the legal system works. 
The variables are (patent applications accepted/province GRP)–1, (number of commercial 
cases received by the court/province population)–1 and (number of lawyers/province 
population)–1, where GRP is gross regional product.
16
 
Corruption measures how serious the corruption situation is in a province for each 
year. The variable is (number of registered corruption cases/province population)–1. 
Finally, as financial factors affecting trade credit development, we consider two 
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 Here, we normalize patent applications accepted and the number of commercial cases 
received by the court (or number of lawyers) by province GRP and population, respectively. 
To check the robustness of our estimates, we also normalized patent applications accepted 
and the number of commercial cases received by the court (or number of lawyers) by 
population and GRP, instead of GRP and population, respectively. Even when we 
exchanged the normalizing denominators, we obtained largely unchanged estimation results, 
but these are not reported for the sake of brevity. When we replaced (number of registered 
corruption cases/province population)–1 with (number of registered corruption 
cases/province GRP)–1, the results were similar to the case for patent applications and 
commercial cases (or lawyers). 
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variables measuring bank loans for non-state-sector firms and the share of non-state-owned 
commercial banks in total bank lending. The first is measured by (bank loans for 
non-state-sector firms/gross assets)–1. The second, namely, share of non-state-owned 
commercial banks in total bank lending–1, is a measure for itself. 
 
4. Data 
We use province-level aggregated data for 2001–2009 as our provincial panel data. 
The dependent variable, trade credit development = accounts receivable for 
non-state-sector firms/gross assets, comes from the China Industry Economy Statistical 
Yearbook for various years and the China Economic Census Yearbook 2004. 
Data for the competitive market environment variables, (number of firms/province 
industrial gross output)–1, (number of firms/province population)–1, and producer price 
indices for manufactured goods–1, were obtained data from the China Statistical Yearbook 
(CSY), as were data for province population. Data on presence of SMEs in gross output–1 
are from Yearbook of China Small and Medium Enterprises for various years. 
We use three legal system variables. Among them, data for (patent applications 
accepted/province GRP)–1 are from CSY. In constructing (number of commercial cases 
received by the court/province population)–1 and (number of lawyers/province 
population)–1, the number of commercial cases received by the court and the number of 
lawyers were obtained from the Law Yearbook of China, China Procuratorial Yearbook, 
China Judicial Administration Yearbook (zhongguo sifa xingzheng nianjian) and Chinese 
Yearbook of Lawyers for various years, as well as by direct data collection from the 
Ministry of Justice of China. 
In constructing the corruption variable (number of registered corruption 
cases/province population)–1, the number of registered corruption cases was obtained from 
17 
 
the China Procuratorial Yearbook. 
Data on (bank loans for non-state-sector firms/gross assets)–1 are from the China 
Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook for various years and the China Economic Census 
Yearbook 2004. Finally, share of non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank 
lending–1 is obtained from the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking for various years 
and directly from the People’s Bank of China. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. 
(Table 1) 
 
5. Estimation results 
Table 2 presents the final system GMM estimation results. 
(Table 2) 
For all specifications, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions shows p-values 
that cannot reject the null hypothesis that instruments used for the estimation are exogenous. 
Furthermore, results for AR(2) also cannot detect serial correlation of eit at the usual critical 
value for any specification. These results confirm the validity of the instruments used. 
For all specifications, the competitive market environment variables (number of 
firms/province industrial gross output)–1, producer price indices for manufactured goods–1 
and presence of SMEs in gross output–1 have significantly positive, negative, and positive 
coefficients, respectively. These results confirm, as suggested by previous studies, that a 
competitive market environment promotes the development of trade credit in China. 
The legal system variables, namely (patent applications accepted/province GRP)–1, 
(number of commercial cases received by the court/province population)–1 and (number of 
lawyers/province population)–1, also have significantly positive coefficients. As found by 
Johnson et al. (2002) for European transition economies, a well-functioning legal system is 
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also very likely to encourage the development of trade credit in China. This finding seems 
to be inconsistent with results observed by Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) that 
firms are more likely to rely on trade credit in economies with inferior legal systems. Taken 
together, the findings of Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic and our results imply that, 
differing from formal financial institutions such as banks, trade credit can act as an 
alternative financial source even under an inferior legal system in developing economies to 
some extent, whereas improving the quality of the legal system is important for further 
development of trade credit. 
The variable (number of registered corruption cases/province population)–1, which 
measures the corruption in province i for year t–1, has a significantly negative influence on 
trade credit development. As expected, corruption harms the development of trade credit. 
One financial factor variable, (bank loans for non-state-sector firms/gross assets)–1, 
has significantly positive coefficients. The other financial factor variable, share of 
non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank lending–1, also has largely significant and 
positive coefficients. Greater bank loans for non-state-sector firms are thus a positive factor 
in the development of trade credit in China. This stems from the trade credit supply 
mechanism whereby more bank loans for non-state-sector firms facilitates credit creation 
among firms using trade credit under the biased financial allocation in which state-sector 
firms are favored for bank loans over non-state-sector firms in China. 
Specification (1)-5 is a dynamic-type model with the one-period lagged dependent 
variable (accounts receivable for non-state-sector firms/gross assets)it–1 as an independent 
variable. The estimated coefficient is significantly negative, and we can obtain largely 
similar results regarding the other independent variables for static specifications. This 
confirms the robustness of our estimation results for empirical model (1). 
Next, we try to disentangle the relations between these determinants of trade credit 
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development in China. 
As explained above, because of these limited instruments, we can easily check the 
first-stage results for system GMM estimation. This check helps us to disentangle the 
complex causal relations between the determinants of trade credit development in China. 
The results are shown in Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
(Tables 3 and 4) 
First, the levels and differences for competitive market environment variables in 
Tables 3 and 4 are affected by two-period lagged levels and one-period lagged differences 
for the legal system and corruption variables, respectively, in addition to those for 
themselves. The levels and differences for the legal-system variable have a positive effect 
and those for the corruption variable have a negative effect on competitive market 
environment variables. This confirms that a well-functioning legal system encourages 
prospective firms to enter the market, possibly via secure property rights and contract 
enforcement, which leads to a competitive market environment. On the contrary, corruption 
discourages prospective firms from entering the market for fear of government exploitation, 
which leads to a less competitive market environment. 
(Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8) 
We skip Tables 5 and 6 and look at the results for first-stage regression with 
corruption variables as the dependent variables in Tables 7 and 8. The corruption variables 
are negatively affected by legal system variables and the financial factor variables 
representing bank loans to non-state-sector firms, in addition to themselves. Thus, we can 
confirm several points. First, we note the bridged causality starting from the legal system 
leading to corruption as an intermediary and eventually resulting in market competitiveness. 
Second, the corruption-promoting effect of financial support of state-sector firms (less 
financial support of non-state-sector firms) through bank lending confirms the mechanism 
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mentioned above: government corruption is mitigated by restraining allocation of abundant 
financial resources to state-sector firms through bank lending in China. 
Finally, legal system variables and the financial factor variables representing bank 
loans to non-state-sector firms in Tables 5–8 are explained only by lagged levels and 
differences for themselves. Differing from our expectation, there is no statistical evidence 
that corruption harms the functioning of the legal system through political pressure from 
the government or that corruption is associated with greater financial support of state-sector 
firms through bank lending. This suggests that the functioning of the legal system and bank 
lending to non-state-sector firms are highly likely to be the starting points for the complex 
causal relations. In addition, they have a direct positive influence on trade credit 
development in China, as we saw above. Therefore, these two factors should be policy 
targets with the highest priority for the development of trade credit. In other words, if 
policy makers want to develop financial intermediation via trade credit in China, improving 
the quality of the legal system and increasing bank lending to non-state-sector firms 
(reducing financial support of state-sector firms through bank lending) can be 
recommended. 
We now return to the final estimation results in Table 2. Specifications (1)-6 and (1)-7 
introduce two interaction terms: (number of commercial cases received by the 
court/province population)–1  (number of lawyers/province population)–1 and (number of 
registered corruption cases/province population)–1  (number of lawyers/province 
population)–1. These are a measure of the effectiveness of an increase in the number of 
lawyers on trade credit development. The first interaction term was introduced to test 
whether an increase in the number of lawyers improves court quality and thus accelerates 
improvements in the legal system. An increase in the number of lawyers is one of the 
easiest policies to implement in improving the functioning of the legal system. The second 
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interaction term was introduced to further investigate whether an increase in the number of 
lawyers and improved functioning of the legal system alleviate the harmful influence of 
corruption on trade credit development. 
Although (1)-6 and (1)-7 are static and dynamic specifications, respectively, these 
two interaction terms have significantly positive coefficients in both specifications. This 
implies that improving the functioning of the legal system by increasing the number of 
lawyers can effectively contribute to the development of trade credit in China. First, the 
significantly positive coefficients for (number of commercial cases received by the 
court/province population)–1  (number of lawyers/province population)–1 suggest that an 
increase in the number of lawyers improves the quality and function of the legal system, 
which can promote trade credit development. Second, the significantly positive coefficients 
for (number of registered corruption cases/province population)–1  (number of 
lawyers/province population)–1 indicate that improving the functioning of the legal system 
by increasing the number of lawyers should alleviate the harmful influence of corruption on 
trade credit development. These results confirm that improving the functioning of the legal 
system is an effective policy target for trade credit development in China and that 




Using Chinese province-level aggregated panel data for 2001–2009, we investigated 
significant determinants for the development of financial intermediation via trade credit in a 
developing economy. The main findings are summarized as follows. 
First, we confirmed that a competitive market environment, a well-functioning legal 
system and greater bank loans for non-state-sector firms promote the development of trade 
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credit in China. In contrast to these factors, corruption hinders its development. 
Second, these factors are not independent but have complex relations with each other. 
We can confirm these relations by checking the first-stage GMM estimation results, which 
is possible because of the limited instrument variables used in collapsed form. For example, 
a well-functioning legal system encourages prospective new firms to enter the market, 
possibly via secure property rights, which leads to a competitive market environment. 
Financial support of state-sector firms through bank lending has a corruption-promoting 
effect because granting of abundant financial resources to state-sector firms tends to 
promote government corruption in China via the stronger ability of these firms to endure 
corruption, namely being grabbed by the government. 
Third, the first-stage GMM estimation results enable us to disentangle the complex 
relations between determinants. The statistical evidence suggests that functioning of the 
legal system and bank lending to non-state-sector firms are highly likely to be the starting 
points for these relations. A policy implication arising from this finding is that improving 
the quality of the legal system and increasing and reducing bank lending to non-state-sector 
and state-sector firms, respectively, should be given higher priorities for the development of 
trade credit in developing economies such as China. 
Finally, an increase in the number of lawyers effectively improves the quality and 
function of the legal system, which in turn alleviates the harmful influence of corruption on 
trade credit development. 
This study clarifies how trade credit develops in a developing economy using 
province-level aggregated panel data. However, many factors in the complicated 
mechanism of trade credit development in developing economies are unknown. Further 
research using firm-level micro data is needed to investigate in more detail what factors 




Acemoglu, D, and Johnson, S (2005), ‘Unbundling Institutions’. Journal of Political 
Economy, 113: 949–995. 
Aktas, N, Bodt, E, Lobez, F, and Statnik C (2012), ‘The information content of trade credit’. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 36: 1402–1413. 
Arellano, M, and Bond, S (1991), ‘Some tests of specifications for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations’. Review of Economic Studies 
58: 277–297. 
Allen, F, Qian, J, and Qian, M (2005), ‘Law, finance, and economic growth in China’. 
Journal of Financial Economics 77: 57–116.   
Ayyagari, M, Demirgüc-Kunt, A, and Maksimovic, V (2010), ‘Formal versus informal 
finance: Evidence from China’. Review of Financial Studies 23: 3048–3097.  
Biais, B, and Gollier, C (1997), ‘Trade Credit and Credit Rationing’. Review of Financial 
Studies 10: 903–937. 
Blundell, R, and Bond, S (1998), ‘Initial conditions and moment restriction in dynamic 
panel data models’. Journal of Econometrics 87: 115–144. 
Brandt, L, and Li, H (2003), ‘Bank discrimination in transition economies: Ideology, 
Information, or Incentives?’ Journal of Comparative Economics 31: 387–413. 
Boyreau-Debray, G, (2003), ‘Financial intermediation and growth: Chinese style’. Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3027, World Bank. 
Burkart, M, and Ellingsen, T (2004), ‘In-kind finance: A theory of trade credit’. American 
Economic Review 94: 569–590. 
Cai, H, Fang, H, and Xu, L (2011), ‘Eat, drink, firms, government: An investigation of 
corruption from the entertainment and travel costs of Chinese firms’. Journal of Law 
and Economics 54: 55–78. 
Cheng, X, and Degryse, H (2007), ‘The impact of banks and non-bank financial institutions 
on local economic growth in China’. BOFIT Discussion Papers 22/2007, Bank of 
Finland. 
Cull, R, and Xu, L (2005), ‘Institutions, ownership, and finance: the Determinants of profit 
reinvestment among Chinese Firms’. Journal of Financial Economics, 77: 117–146. 
Cull, R, Xu, L, and Zhu, T (2009), ‘Formal finance and trade credit during China’s 
transition’. Journal of Financial Intermediation 18: 173–192. 
Demirgüc-Kunt, A, and Maksimovic, V (2001), ‘Firms as financial intermediaries: 




Ding, S, Guariglia, A, and Knight, J (2012), ‘Investment and financing constraint in China: 
Does working capital make a difference?’. Journal of Banking and Finance 37: 
1490-1507. 
Du, J, Lu, Y, and Tao, Z (2012), ‘Bank loans vs. trade credit: Evidence from China’. 
Economics of Transition 20: 1–24. 
Fabbri, D, and Klapper, L (2008), ‘Market power and the matching of trade credit terms’. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4754, World Bank. 
Fafchamps, M (2004), Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and Evidence. 
MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts)/London.  
Fisman, R, and Love, I (2003) ‘Trade Credit, Financial Intermediary Development, and 
Industry Growth’. The Journal of Finance 58: 353–374. 
Fisman, R, and Raturi, M (2004), ‘Does competition encourage credit provision? Evidence 
from African trade credit relationships’. Review of Economics and Statistics 86: 
345–352. 
Giannetti, M, Burkart, M, and Ellingsen, T (2011), ‘What You Sell Is What You Lend? 
Explaining Trade Credit Contracts’. Review of Financial Studies 24: 1299–1335. 
Guariglia, A, Liu, X, and Song, L (2011), ‘Internal finance and growth: Microeconometric 
evidence on Chinese firms’. Journal of Development Economics 96: 79–84. 
Guariglia, A, and Poncet, S (2008), ‘Could financial distortion be no impediment to 
economic growth after all? Evidence from China’. Journal of Comparative 
Economics 36: 633–657. 
Ge, Y, and Qiu, J (2007), ‘Financial development, bank discrimination and trade credit’. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 31: 513–530. 
Hyndman, K, and Serio, G (2010), ‘Competition and inter-firm credit: Theory and evidence 
from firm-level data in Indonesia’. Journal of Development Economics 93: 88–108. 
Johnson, S, McMillan, J, and Woodruff, C (2002), ‘Court and relational contracts’. Journal 
of Law, Economics, and Organization 18: 221–277.  
Nilsen, H (2002), ‘Trade Credit and The Bank Lending Channel of Monetary 
Transmission’. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 34: 226–253. 
Özlü, P, and Yalçın, C. (2012), ‘The trade credit channel of monetary policy transmission: 
Evidence from Non-Financial Firms in Turkey’. Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 
48: 102–117.  
Petersen, A, and Rajan, G (1997), ‘Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence’. Review of 
Financial Studies 10: 661–691. 
Roodman, D (2008), ‘How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM 
25 
 
in Stata’. Working Paper 103, Center for Global Development. 
Roodman, D (2009), ‘A note on the theme of too many instruments’. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics 71: 135–158. 
Van Horen, N (2004), ‘Trade credit as a competitiveness tool; Evidence from developing 
countries’. MPRA Paper 2792. 
Windmeijer, F (2005), ‘A finite sample correction for the variance of linear two-step GMM 




































Notes and Accounts Receivable/Gross Assets 
      Fig. 1 Correlation between notes and accounts receivable/gross assets 
and gross output per capita in provinces for all industrial firms in 2008                                     
                                                            Source: China Economic Census Yearbook 2008 (zhonggou jingji pucha nianjian) 
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Fig. 2 Accounts receivable/gross assets 





Source: China Indusry Economy Statistical Yearbook (zhonggou  gongye jingji tongji nianjian ), 
various years, and  China Economic Census Yearbook (zhonggou jingji pucha)
1 The coastal areas here comprise the following provinces: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Fujian, and Guangdong. The interior areas studied 
comprise the other provinces.
              Accounts receivable Mean Std. Dev. Obs. No.
Dependent Variables: Private Sector Investment
        Accounts receivable for non state-sector firms / gross assets 0.124 0.040 279
Independent Variables
(1)  Competitive market environment
       (Number of firms / province industrial gross output )–1 1.469 1.945 279
        (per 100 millions RMB)
       Producer price indices for manufactured goods –1 
1 0.946 0.147 279
       Presence of SMEs in gross output –1 0.633 0.279 279
(2) Legal system
       (Patent applications accepted / province GRP )–1 1.395 0.993 279
       (Number of commercial cases received by the court  / province
population )–1
1.711 0.795 279
       (Number of lawyers  / province population )–1 1.399 1.423 279
(3) Corruption 
       (Number of registered corruption cases  / province population )–1 3.012 1.007 279
(4) Financial factors
       (Bank loans for non-state-sector firms / gross assets )–1 0.482 0.089 279
       Share of non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank lending –1 0.461 0.113 279
1
 The Producer price indices for manufactured goods –1 used in our regression is deflated one by GDP deflator for each year.
Descriptive Statistic for 31 Provinces during the Period 2001-2009
Table 1
Independent Variables (1)-1 (1)-2 (1)-3 (1)-4 (1)-5 (1)-6 (1)-7
Province dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummy variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(1)  Competitive market environment
       (Number of firms / province industrial gross output )–1 0.004** 0.003** 0.004** 0.003** 0.006** 0.004** 0.005**
(8.110) (7.183) (9.131) (7.109) (9.182) (10.224) (8.206)
       Producer price indices for manufactured goods –1 -0.016* -0.013* -0.011* -0.016** -0.019** -0.015* -0.015*
 (-2.571)  (-2.549)  (-2.241)  (-3.015)  (-2.666)  (-2.476)  (-2.341)
       Presence of SMEs in gross output –1 0.007** 0.010** 0.007* 0.010** 0.009** 0.007** 0.009*
(2.649) (3.403) (2.527) (3.072) (2.932) (3.088) (2.141)
(2) Legal system
       (Patent applications accepted / province GRP )–1 0.011* 0.007* 0.010* 0.010 0.010* 0.011*
(2.200) (2.191) (2.113) (1.855) (2.169) (2.379)
       (Number of commercial cases received by the court  / province
population )–1
0.009* 0.011* 0.010* 0.007** 0.007* 0.007**
(2.151) (2.449) (2.469) (2.578) (2.388) (2.636)
       (Number of lawyers  / province population )–1 0.007** 0.008** 0.006** 0.006** 0.005** 0.005**
(4.960) (6.157) (3.785) (3.336) (3.161) (2.639)
       (Number of commercial cases received by the court  / province
population )–1
0.005** 0.006**
        ✕   (Number of lawyers / province population )–1 (2.746) (3.293)
(3) Corruption 
       (Number of registered corruption cases  / province population )–1 -0.005* -0.006* -0.006* -0.005** -0.007 -0.006* -0.006**
 (-2.272)  (-2.489)  (-2.162)  (-2.655)  (-1.953)  (-2.009)  (-2.636)
       (Number of registered corruption cases  / province population )–1 0.001** 0.001*
        ✕   (Number of lawyers / province population )–1 (2.610) (2.399)
(4) Financial factors
       (Bank loans for non-state-sector firms / gross assets )–1 0.021* 0.018* 0.020** 0.027* 0.019* 0.029** 0.026*
(2.076) (2.392) (2.611) (2.535) (2.302) (2.665) (2.372)
       Share of non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank lending –1 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.010* 0.008 0.008* 0.007
(1.500) (1.695) (1.754) (2.355) (1.878) (1.969) (1.837)
(5) Lagged dependent variable
(Accounts receivable for non state-sector firms / gross assets )–1 -0.107* -0.086*
 (-2.356)  (-2.048)
p-value of Hansen test 0.261 0.208 0.275 0.315 0.153 0.218 0.182
p-value of AR(2) test 0.198 0.266 0.132 0.180 0.400 0.196 0.300
Obs. No. 279 279 279 279 279 279 279
1
 The table presents Blundel and Bond's two-step system GMM results. The dependent variable is  Accounts receivable for non state-sector firms/gross assets.
   We report in parentheses the z statistics that based on the Windmeijer (2005)'s finite sample correction to 
   the standard errors in two-step estimation.
2
 The table presents regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are the z statistics.
* Siginificant at 5%.
** Siginificant at 1%.
Dep. Var. =  Accounts receivable for non state-sector firms / gross assets
Determinants of Trade Credit Development: The Final Results for System GMM Estimation 
1 2
Table 2
The First-stage Results for System GMM Estimation (1): Dep. Var = First-Differenced One 
1
Δ(Number of firms / province
industrial gross output )–1
ΔProducer price indices for
manufactured goods –1
       ΔPresence of SMEs in
gross output –1
Province dummy variables yes yes yes
Year dummy variables yes yes yes
(1)  Competitive market environment
       (Number of firms / province industrial gross output )–2 0.001** -0.0002 0.0001*
(2.904)  (-1.806) (1.963)
       Producer price indices for manufactured goods –2 -0.000 0.003* -0.0002**
 (-0.898) (2.019) (2.701)
       Presence of SMEs in gross output –2 0.000 -0.000 0.001*
(1.173)  (-0.882) (2.455)
(2) Legal system
       (Patent applications accepted / province GRP )–2 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(1.475)  (-1.777) (1.370)
       (Number of commercial cases received by the court  /
province population )–2
0.002** -0.0002** 0.0003*
(2.916)  (-2.703) (3.006)
       (Number of lawyers  / province population )–2 0.001* -0.0001* 0.0001*
(1.990)  (-2.229) (2.000)
(3) Corruption 
       (Number of registered corruption cases  / province
population )–2
-0.0001* 0.00001** -0.00003**
 (-2.295) (2.611)  (-3.522)
(4) Financial factors
       (Bank loans for non-state-sector firms / gross assets )–2 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(1.007)  (-1.138) (0.788)
       Share of non-state-owned commercial banks 0.000 0.000 0.000
in total bank lending –2 (1.565) (0.261) (1.772)
R
2 0.417 0.405 0.297
F statistics 21.369 20.335 12.621
Obs. No. 248 248 248
1
 Δx –1 is defined as change of variable x  between periods t–1 and t–2:
   : x –1– x –2.
(1)  Competitive market environment
Table 3
The First-stage Results for System GMM Estimation (1): Dep. Var = Level One 
1
(Number of firms / province
industrial gross output )–1
Producer price indices for
manufactured goods –1
       Presence of SMEs in gross
output –1
ΔYear dummy variables yes yes yes
(1)  Competitive market environment
      Δ(Number of firms / province industrial gross output )–1 0.010* -0.002* 0.035*
(2.431)  (-2.021) (2.515)
       ΔProducer price indices for manufactured goods –1 -0.000 0.029** -0.003
 (-1.025) (2.890)  (-0.894)
       ΔPresence of SMEs in gross output –1 0.006** -0.005 0.018**
(2.774)  (-0.732) (2.737)
(2) Legal system
      Δ(Patent applications accepted / province GRP )–1 0.006* -0.001 0.021*
(1.968)  (-1.580) (2.130)
      Δ(Number of commercial cases received by the court  /
province population )–1
0.028* -0.002* 0.095**
(2.331)  (-2.489) (2.676)
      Δ(Number of lawyers  / province population )–1 0.010* -0.001** 0.033*
(1.965)  (-3.047) (2.096)
(3) Corruption 
      Δ(Number of registered corruption cases  / province
population )–1
-0.001* 0.0001** -0.003
 (-2.083) (2.727)  (-1.925)
(4) Financial factors
       Δ(Bank loans for non-state-sector firms / gross assets )–1 0.001 -0.001 0.004
(0.914)  (-1.155) (0.785)
       ΔShare of non-state-owned commercial banks 0.001 -0.000 0.003*
in total bank lending –1 (1.189)  (-1.574) (2.200)
R
2 0.381 0.361 0.260
F statistics 18.388 16.878 10.497
Obs. No. 248 248 248
1
 Δx –1 is defined as change of variable x  between periods t–1 and t–2:
   : x –1– x –2.
Table 4
(1)  Competitive market environment
Δ(Patent applications accepted
/ province GRP )–1
Δ(Number of commercial cases
received by the court  / province
population )–1
Δ(Number of lawyers /
province population )–1
Province dummy variables yes yes yes
Year dummy variables yes yes yes
(1)  Competitive market environment
       (Number of firms / province industrial gross output )–2 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.393) (0.301) (0.136)
       Producer price indices for manufactured goods –2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
 (-0.048)  (-0.013)  (-0.085)
       Presence of SMEs in gross output –2 0.002 0.002 0.000
(1.043) (0.673) (0.582)
(2) Legal system
       (Patent applications accepted / province GRP )–2 0.002** 0.001* 0.001*
(3.895) (2.189) (1.965)




       (Number of lawyers  / province population )–2 0.0004* 0.001** 0.0001**
(2.028) (2.826) (3.868)
(3) Corruption 





       (Bank loans for non-state-sector firms / gross assets )–2 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.201) (0.706) (0.670)
       Share of non-state-owned commercial banks 0.000 0.000 0.000
in total bank lending –2 (0.525) (0.049) (0.210)
R
2 0.357 0.349 0.288
F statistics 16.587 16.016 12.084
Obs. No. 248 248 248
1
 Δx –1 is defined as change of variable x  between periods t–1 and t–2:
   : x –1– x –2.
(2) Legal system
The First-stage Results for System GMM Estimation (2): Dep. Var = First-Differenced One 
1
Table 5
(Patent applications accepted /
province GRP )–1
(Number of commercial cases
received by the court  /
province population )–1
(Number of lawyers / province
population )–1
ΔYear dummy variables yes yes yes
(1)  Competitive market environment
      Δ(Number of firms / province industrial gross output )–1 0.001 0.000 0.000
(1.028) (0.597) (0.706)
       ΔProducer price indices for manufactured goods –1 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.444)  (-1.099)  (-0.968)
       ΔPresence of SMEs in gross output –1 0.017 0.025 0.017
(0.630) (1.001) (0.588)
(2) Legal system
      Δ(Patent applications accepted / province GRP )–1 0.026** 0.011** 0.011**
(3.598) (2.618) (2.883)




      Δ(Number of lawyers  / province population )–1 0.005* 0.010* 0.001**
(2.117) (2.127) (4.458)
(3) Corruption 





       Δ(Bank loans for non-state-sector firms / gross assets )–1 0.018 0.009 0.012
(0.132) (0.086) (0.182)
       ΔShare of non-state-owned commercial banks 0.010 0.006 0.003
in total bank lending –1 (0.342) (0.199) (0.510)
R
2 0.285 0.325 0.247
F statistics 11.908 14.384 9.800
Obs. No. 248 248 248
1
 Δx –1 is defined as change of variable x  between periods t–1 and t–2:
   : x –1– x –2.
Table 6





corruption cases  / province
population )–1
Δ(Bank loans for non-state-
sector firms  / gross assets )–1
Province dummy variables yes yes
Year dummy variables yes yes
(1)  Competitive market environment
       (Number of firms / province industrial gross output )–2 -0.000 0.000
 (-0.495) (0.809)
       Producer price indices for manufactured goods –2 -0.000 0.000
 (-0.691) (1.297)
       Presence of SMEs in gross output –2 -0.000 -0.000
 (-0.631)  (-0.739)
(2) Legal system
       (Patent applications accepted / province GRP )–2 -0.001* 0.000
 (-2.192) (1.762)




       (Number of lawyers  / province population )–2 -0.001** 0.000
 (-7.175) (1.410)
(3) Corruption 





       (Bank loans for non-state-sector firms / gross assets )–2 -0.0005** 0.011**
 (-3.001) (13.930)
       Share of non-state-owned commercial banks -0.001* 0.005**
in total bank lending –2  (-2.523) (4.020)
R
2 0.395 0.279
F statistics 19.505 11.561
Obs. No. 248 248
1
 Δx –1 is defined as change of variable x  between periods t–1 and t–2:
   : x –1– x –2.






corruption cases  / province
population )–1
(Bank loans for non-state-
sector firms  / gross assets )–1
ΔYear dummy variables yes yes
(1)  Competitive market environment
      Δ(Number of firms / province industrial gross output )–1 0.000 0.000
(0.493) (1.157)
       ΔProducer price indices for manufactured goods –1 0.000 -0.000
(0.086)  (-1.640)
       ΔPresence of SMEs in gross output –1 0.000 0.001
(0.844) (1.449)
(2) Legal system
      Δ(Patent applications accepted / province GRP )–1 -0.006 0.001
 (-1.801) (0.901)




      Δ(Number of lawyers  / province population )–1 -0.012** 0.001
 (-3.226) (1.132)
(3) Corruption 





       Δ(Bank loans for non-state-sector firms / gross assets )–1 -0.005** 0.137**
 (-2.578) (14.767)
       ΔShare of non-state-owned commercial banks -0.004** 0.059**
in total bank lending –1  (-2.877) (5.609)
R
2 0.383 0.251
F statistics 18.545 10.012
Obs. No. 248 248
1
 Δx –1 is defined as change of variable x  between periods t–1 and t–2:
   : x –1– x –2.
Table 8
The First-stage Results for System GMM Estimation (3) and (4): Dep. Vars = Level Ones 
1
(4) Financial factors
